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ABSTRACT
In the structure of Brazilian Government, regarding both the executive as well as the 
executive powers, the increase in ways in which society can participate in decisions 
of public interest, stands out. Among the shared or participatory managerial policies 
implemented  in  Brazil,  the  following  are  noteworthy:  the  participatory  budget, 
managerial  councils,  committees  dealing  with  watersheds,  thematic  conferences, 
plebiscites,  public  meetings and referenda.   However,  if  compared to the size of 
Brazil’s  territory and population,  the experiences of  participatory management are 
rare and have developed mainly in the southern and southeastern regions of the 
country.  In  most  Brazilian  municipalities,  politics  by  patronage,  authoritarian  and 
populist,  is the rule, linked to changes in the parties and to the electoral mandate 
(four years).  
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1. Historical and legal context
The  democratic  process  in  Brazil  has  suffered  various  disruptions  since  its 
beginnings at the start of colonization up to now. Exercising democracy in Brazil is 
considered by the great majority as a synonym for electoral contests restricted to 
electoral campaigns and voting. 
The conquest of the right of the Brazilian citizen to participate in decisions involving 
the development of his/ her country was due to social movements which strived to 
make Brazil democratic, culminating in the creation of areas for citizens’ participation 
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution (BRASIL, 1988). 
At present, Brazil has its sovereignty guaranteed by universal suffrage and  by direct 
and secret voting, where all are considered equal, and also occurs through elections 
for the Executive and Legislative branches at the three levels of government (federal, 
state and municipal), plebiscites, referenda and public initiatives. These mechanisms 
for  direct  democracy  are  set  out  in  Article  14,  clauses  I  to  III  of  the  Federal 
Constitution (1988).
2. Plebiscite 
The 1937 Constitution was the first to define the role of the plebiscite in Brazil and 
was for incorporating, subdividing or annexing states, according to the wishes of the 
President  of  the Republic.  The 1946 Constitution included only  the incorporation, 
subdivision  or  dismembering  of  states.  The 1967 Constitution,  during  the military 
government,  did  not  even  include  the  possibility  of  public  consultation  in  cases 
dealing  with  territory  and  this  topic  became  dependent  on  regulation  by  a 
supplementary law. 
The first plebiscite in Brazil at the federal level was held in January 1963, and asked 
for  people’s  opinion on the system of  government (presidential  or  parliamentary), 
since  the  parliamentary  system had  been  introduced  to  hinder  the  João  Goulart 
government which had socialist tendencies and which frightened both the military as 
well as those who wielded power at the time.  On the 6th,  out of an electorate of 18 
million, 11,531,030 voters voted in the plebiscite. The result determined a return to 
the presidential system, by 9,457,448 votes to 2,073,582.
In  the  1988  Constitution,  the  plebiscite  is  described  in  five  articles:  article  14,  I, 
declares  the  exercise  of  popular  sovereignty  also  through  plebiscites;  article  18 
allows for the incorporation, subdivision and dismembering of the states; article 18, 
4th paragraph, talks of the creation, incorporation, fusion and dismembering of the 
municipalities;  article 49, XV, establishes the exclusive jurisdiction of the National 
Congress  to  convene  plebiscites;  and  the  2nd article  of  the  Act  of  Transitional 
Constitutional Arrangements determined a plebiscite to choose the form and  system 
of government in 1993.
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For this system to function, an infra-constitutional legislation, which is dynamic and 
which guarantees its practical application, is necessary. However, for ten years Brazil 
did  nothing  about  infra-constitutional  arrangements.   Therefore,  even  though 
provided for constitutionally the mechanisms of direct democracy were unavailable in 
practice, and this can be regarded as a historical regression since, with the exception 
of  the  1993  plebiscite,  there  is  no  significant  example  of  the  use  of  these 
mechanisms.
Plebiscite of 1993, on 21/04/1993 
General Information
Municipalities Sections Electorate Electors who voted Abstentions





Blank Votes 240,328 9.74%





Blank Votes 130,893 5.30%
Invalid Votes 370,159 15.00%
Source: http://www.tre-sc.gov.br/eleicoes/histeleiweb/1993/InfGeraisMunicM1993.htm 
An infra-constitutional law to regulate the plebiscite, the referendum and the public 
initiative (Law 9.7091 of 18/11/1998) was only ready in 1998. This law states that a 
plebiscite will be convened before the legislative or administrative act, and that it is 
the public who will  vote to approve or reject the subject under discussion. The 3rd 
article of the same law establishes that in questions of relevant national interest, the 
National Congress will convene a plebiscite through a legislative decree, proposed 
by a minimum of at least one third of the members of either of the two houses. This 
legal mechanism takes away from society the possibility of deciding what subjects it 
considers  relevant  for  discussion  and  consultation  at  the  national  level,  since  it 
restricts this prerogative to the National Congress.  
1 According to Law 9.709, the plebiscite can examine subjects of significant constitutional, administrative 
or legislative relevance, and can also be used or not, to approve normative acts. 
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Law 9.709 had gaps and did not represent significant advances in the   exercise of 
public  sovereignty,  as  well  as  not  regulating  important  topics  on  the  viability  of 
applying mechanisms of direct democracy in Brazil.  Unfortunately, the mechanisms 
for  public  participation  in  Brazil  are  still  not  rights  which  constitute  part  of  daily 
politics, so much so that many Brazilians are not even aware of them. 
The plebiscite in Brazil can take two forms: the extensive and the fundamental. The 
extensive  form  examines  any  question  of  national  relevance  falling  within  the 
jurisdiction of the Executive and Legislative branches (the Judiciary is not included). 
The fundamental form is related to the incorporation, subdivision and dismembering 
of  the  states,  or  the  fusion,  incorporation,  creation  and  dismembering  of  the 
municipalities. 
In September 2000, Brazil  had a national plebiscite on the Foreign Debt with the 
overall objective of consulting all adult Brazilian citizens to give their opinion and vote 
on Brazil’s internal and foreign debts. 
The plebiscite on the foreign debt also had the following aims: 
1. to take the debate to public opinion and the grass roots,  making available 
information and explanations so that the population could become aware of 
the fact that the internal and foreign debts were one of the main causes of the 
deepening of the social and ecological debts. 
2. to put this topic on the agenda of public mobilizations and, based on practice, 
question the neo-liberal  economic model adopted in Brazil,  thus fighting to 
recuperate national sovereignty ; 
3. to concentrate forces to demand a public audit  of  the foreign and internal 
debts, the suspension of the payment of the foreign debt and the adoption of 
controls on debt policy.  
Results of the plebiscite on Foreign Debt: 
In  the  plebiscite,  more  than  6  million  electors  voted,  or  5.7%  of  the  Brazilian 
electorate (data from the TSE for 1998). 
The results for each question were as follows:  
Question 1: On the FMI
Should  the  Brazilian  Government  maintain  the  actual  agreement  with  the 
International Monetary Fund - FMI? 
5,646,862 replied "no", 
280,442 replied "yes", 
76,574 blank votes and 
26,451 invalid votes. 
Question 2: On the Foreign Debt 
Should Brazil continue to pay the foreign debt without a public audit of this debt as  
provided for in the 1988 Constitution? 
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5,765,954 replied "no", 
182,462 replied "yes", 
57,954 blank votes and  
23,959 invalid votes. 
Question 3: On the Internal Debt 
Should the federal, state and municipal governments continue using a large part of  
the public budget to pay the internal debt to the speculators?  
5,768,563 replied "no", 
158,995 replied "yes", 
80,481 blank votes and
22,290 invalid votes
At the state and municipal levels, the plebiscite is convened according to the state 
constitutions and the fundamental municipal laws. The State of São Paulo can be 
cited as an example, where article 20, clause XVIII of the State Constitution declares 
that the convening of the plebiscite falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State 
Legislative Assembly.  However,  citizens can ask the High Electoral Tribunal for a 
plebiscite,  proposed  by  at  least  1% (one  per  cent)  of  the  electorate,  distributed 
between at least 5 of the 15 largest municipalities of São Paulo State, with not less 
than 0.2% (two tenths of a per cent) of electors from each one of them, and taking 
into account the wishes of the Legislative Assembly. The Constitution, however, does 
not  state  the  criteria  for  defining  the  15  largest  municipalities  of  the  state,  thus 
making the correct interpretation and implementation of the plebiscite difficult. 
The São Paulo state constitution also establishes that a plebiscite be held in cases of 
fusion, creation, incorporation and dismemberment of municipalities, under the same 
conditions as the national legislation, as long as the population directly involved is 
heard, and certain conditions stipulated by law are observed, such as a minimum 
population of 2,500 inhabitants, an electorate of not less than 10% of the population, 
and the urban centre already constituted with  at  least  200 houses,  among other 
conditions. 
At  the  municipal  level,  in  general,  the  fundamental  laws  possess  guidelines  and 
procedures for carrying out plebiscites. In the fundamental law for São Paulo (SP) 
municipality,  for  example,  in  article  10  a  plebiscite  may  be  called  before  the 
discussion  and  approval  of  expensive  public  works  or  those which  can  cause  a 
significant  environmental  impact.   In  this  case,  the  Legislative  and  Executive 
branches should take the initiative to convene the plebiscite. However, the legislation 
does not specify the approximate value of the public works which may be the object 
of  a public consultation, with the convening of the latter being at the discretion of the 
Legislative or Executive branches.  
Article 44, II of the Fundamental Law of São Paulo provides for a citizens’ initiative to 
request the town council to carry out the plebiscite on a subject of relevant interest to 
the municipality or district, through the manifestation of at least  1% (one per cent) of 
the municipal electorate.
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3. Referendum
The referendum was only recognized under Brazilian law with the 1988 Constitution 
and is regulated by Law 9.709/98 together with the plebiscite and the public initiative. 
According to the 2nd paragraph of this law, a referendum is called after the legislative 
or  administrative  act,  and  the  people  decide  on  its  ratification  or  rejection.  The 
differentiation made by the legislation is basically related to the timing: the plebiscite 
is convened before the legislative or administrative act, object of the consultation, 
whereas the convening of the referendum is afterwards. The National Congress has 
exclusive jurisdiction to authorize the referendum based on people’s signatures. An 
important example of a subject of relevant national interest, which should have been 
submitted to a referendum, was constitutional amendment 41 (2003), which altered 
the rules of the National Pensions scheme. However,  public  consultation was not 
anticipated,  and  neither  are  there  any  signs  that  this  might  happen,  which 
demonstrates how fragile the implementation of public consultation in Brazil still is. 
In October 2005, Brazil held the first referendum in the world in which the population 
was  consulted  on  disarmament.  The  Brazilian  electorate  voted,  using  electronic 
voting machines, about whether the selling of arms and ammunition should continue 
to exist in the country or, on the contrary, this commercialization should stop. The 
prohibition  of  the  commercialization  of  arms  was  already  part  of  the  Statute  of 
Disarmament (Law 10.826/2003), but this would only have become  valid through the 
referendum.  The  result  of  the  referendum  was:  59,109,265  electors  (63.94%) 
decided to vote NO, the commercialization of arms and ammunition will  continue. 
The YES vote was the preference of 33,333,045 electors (36.06%).
At the state level, using São Paulo state as an example, the referendum is set out 
under  article  20,  clause  XVIII,  which  defines  that  the  Legislative  Assembly  has 
exclusive  jurisdiction  for  its  authorization.   In  article   24,  the  São  Paulo  state 
constitution opens an important door for extending the referendum by permitting that 
1% (one per cent) of the state electorate request the Legislative Assembly to call a 
referendum. In this aspect, the São Paulo state constitution is more wide ranging 
than the Federal Constitution and Law 9.709/98, when it says that the prerogative for 
requesting a referendum also belongs to the citizens, that is, it is not an exclusive 
prerequisite of the Legislative Branch. 
4. Public Initiative
According to the Brazilian Federal  Constitution (1988),  the public initiative can be 
exercised by presenting the Chamber of Deputies with a law project, supported by at 
least  1%  (one  per  cent)  of  the  national  electorate  (about  1.2  million  electors), 
distributed throughout at least five Brazilian states, with not less than three tenths of 
a per cent from each. The regulation of the public initiative is also set out in Law 
9.709/98. 
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The large number of signatures needed and the distribution throughout the states are 
factors which make the use of the public initiative mechanism, as an instrument of 
democratic participation, more difficult. 
In general, the projects of laws originating from the public initiative are presented as 
a motion or  articled exposition.   The motion is  presented to Congress  through a 
simple text explaining the subject to be regulated. In the articled exposition, a series 
of items is presented which will guide the parliamentarians in developing principles. 
The state constitutions and the fundamental municipal laws also talk about the public 
initiative.  Some states were  more wide ranging,  allowing  their  constitutions to be 
amended through public initiatives, as for the states of São Paulo and Rio Grande do 
Sul. Others have only adopted the clauses set out in the Federal Constitution. 
An example of a public initiative project, which was successful and which happened 
in record time, was that regarding the buying of electoral votes (electoral corruption). 
The project was presented to Congress on the August 10th, 1999 and was approved 
on the 21st and 23rd of September, by the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal 
Senate  respectively.   Five  days  later  Law  9.840  was  in  force,  and  decreed 
punishment  for  “the  candidate  who  gives,  offers,  promises  or  hands  over  to  the 
elector, with the aim of obtaining his or her vote, goods or personal advantage of any 
nature, including a job or public position, from the registration of the candidacy until 
election  day”.  The  punishment  anticipated  is  the  annulment  of  the  candidate’s 
mandate as well as a fine. 
5. The electoral system and the democratic process
The present Brazilian Electoral Code originates from Law nº 4.737 of 15th July, 1965, 
which established standards to guarantee the organization and exercise of political 
rights, principally those of voting and being voted.  According to the Code, all power 
emanates from the people and will be exercised in its name by those chosen to hold 
a  mandate,  directly  and  secretly,  among  candidates  chosen  by  national  political 
parties, except in some cases of indirect elections regulated by the Constitution and 
in specific laws. 
The  Federal  Constitution  (1988)  and  the  Electoral  Code  (1965)  determine  that 
electoral enrollment and the vote are obligatory for Brazilians who are older than 18; 
and optional for those who cannot read nor write, are older than 70, and those older 
than 16 but less than 18.  
Government  representatives  are chosen by Brazilian  voters  in  direct  elections  at 
three levels:  1) federal – executive: President of the Republic,  legislative: senators 
and  federal  deputies;  2)  state  –  state  governor,  legislative:  state  deputies;  3) 
municipal  –  executive:  mayor,  legislative:  town  councillors.  In  this  form  of 
government, the decisions taken at the federal level take priority over those at the 
state level, which takes priority over those at the municipal level.
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The main attributes of public institutions are the drawing up, approval and application 
of regulations and laws, and the planning and implementation of programmes and 
services to the population. To do this, they can count on a legislative, judicial and 
executive infrastructure. The executive framework at the federal level is composed of 
the President  of  the Republic  and the Vice-president,  who are helped by diverse 
organs and entities, directly or indirectly, such as ministries and secretariats. In order 
to carry out programmes, governments establish priorities for the spending of public 
funds, drawn up in the Pluriannual Plan (PPA), and harmonizing long-term projects 
with  the Annual Budget Law. The budget lays out what  funds are to be used for 
government initiatives. 
In the structure of Brazilian Government, regarding both the executive as well as the 
executive powers, the increase in ways in which society can participate in decisions 
of public interest, stands out. Among the shared or participatory managerial policies 
implemented  in  Brazil,  the  following  are  noteworthy:  the  participatory  budget, 
managerial  councils,  committees  dealing  with  watersheds,  thematic  conferences, 
plebiscites,  public  meetings and referenda.   However,  if  compared to the size of 
Brazil’s  territory and population,  the experiences of  participatory management are 
rare and have developed mainly in the southern and southeastern regions of the 
country.  In  most  Brazilian  municipalities,  politics  by  patronage,  authoritarian  and 
populist,  is the rule, linked to changes in the parties and to the electoral mandate 
(four years). 
Linked to the patronage of Brazilian politics and to the large social, economic and 
cultural inequalities, is the citizen’s lack of knowledge of his/ her real participatory 
rights. “The advance obtained in the institutionalization of citizen’s rights has still not 
been  translated  into  the  building  up  of  the  necessary  capabilities  for  its  real 
enjoyment” (ANASTASIA, 2006). 
In many so-called “democratic“ governments, participation comes down to including 
the  population  with  the  aim of  ratifying  decisions  already  taken,  which  does  not 
guarantee the actual right of the citizen to participate but only to be consulted. In 
other  cases,  popular  decisions  on  public  affairs  end  up  not  being  implemented 
because  the  implementation  of  collective  decisions  represents  a  big  obstacle  for 
governments, since it runs up against the weakness of political support  and the lack 
of financial and human resources. Therefore, in spite of the fact that many areas for 
popular participation are of a deliberative character, in practice, they become tools for 
political  manipulation  and  contribute  to  society  not  believing  in  democratic 
mechanisms. 
The  actual  state  of  Brazilian  democracy  has  historical  roots  going  back  to  the 
beginning  of  colonization.  There  were  many  disputes  involved  in  implementing 
democracy because for many years the predominant sectors of society were mainly 
responsible  for  opposing  democracy  and  for  resistance  to  social  and  political 
changes in the country. 
The elections in Brazil came about with the arrival of the colonizers, who followed the 
Portuguese  tradition  of  electing  the  administrators  of  settlements  under  their 
governance. The first election for local government happened in 1532, to elect the 
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Municipal Council of the settlement of São Vicente (SP) and they continued until the 
country’s independence (1822). 
Up to 1828, elections for Brazilian municipalities obeyed the Laws of the Kingdom of 
Portugal.  At the beginning,  the whole population had the right to vote. With time, 
however,  the vote came to be the exclusive  right  of  those who had the greatest 
economic power, amongst other prerogatives. The minimum age for voting was 25. 
Slaves, women, Indians and salaried workers could not vote. 
The elections took place in four stages: the citizens of each parish, without any voting 
restrictions, nominated so-called “arbitrators”, citizens who would choose the electors 
of the parish. These, in turn, would choose the electors of the district, who, finally, 
would elect the deputies. In 1822, the process changed to one of two stages: the 
citizens  of  the parish  would  choose their  electors  and these would  nominate the 
deputies. In 1881,  the Saraiva Law introduced direct elections.
Up to 1891, when the Constitution determined the separation between Church and 
State, the Church influenced the choice of representatives and those who governed 
in Brazil.  During a certain period, one of the conditions for being elected a deputy 
was  to  be  a  catholic  and  some  elections  even  took  place  within  the  churches 
themselves.  
Apart from the influence of the Catholic Church, elections in Brazil  suffered many 
interventions from governments during the Empire (1822-1889) and the Old Republic 
(1891-1930). In the Empire, the elections, whose rules were copied from the French 
model,  were controlled by the Emperor through the Brazilian Secretariat  for State 
Business,  the  presidents  of  the  provinces  and  the  rural  oligarchy.   In  order  to 
guarantee a majority for the government, electoral reforms were made on the eve of 
elections.  All  this  generated  innumerable  possibilities  for  fraud.   During  the  Old 
Republic,  the “governors”  policy”  reigned supreme:  the President  of  the Republic 
would support candidates indicated by the governors in the state elections and these, 
in turn, would support the candidate indicated by the President in the presidential 
elections.  The process depended on the action of the colonels (big land owners), 
who controlled the electorate, gave support  to the candidates and supervised the 
non-secret vote of the electors and vote counting. In this way, the elections almost 
always ended predictably. 
The Proclamation of the Republic (1889) initiated a new period of Brazilian electoral 
legislation  which  was  now based  on  North  American  models.  The  first  electoral 
innovation was the elimination of the "pecuniary census" or "taxpayer vote" (where 
electors were selected according to their annual income).
The first Republican Constitution (1891) created the presidential system  in which the 
president and the vice-president were elected by direct, national suffrage, with an 
absolute majority of the votes; gave the National Congress the job of regulating the 
electoral process for federal posts in the whole country, and to the states, legislation 
on state and municipal elections. 
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In  1916,  Law  No.  3.139  gave  the  Judiciary  the  responsibility  for  preparing  the 
electoral rolls, which resulted in the first Electoral Code of Brazil and the setting up of 
the Electoral Judiciary (1932).  This institution became responsible for the electoral 
rolls, the organization of the polling booth, the counting of votes, the recognition and 
proclamation of those elected, as well as regulating the federal, state and municipal 
elections in the country. 
The Electoral Code introduced voting in secret, votes for women and the system of 
proportional  representation  in  two  simultaneous  rounds.  This  code  already 
anticipated the voting machine which only came into use in the 1990s. 
Advances in electoral legislation were present in the 1934 Constitution. At the same 
time,  in  accordance with  the  Constitution,  the  President  of  the  Republic  (Getúlio 
Vargas) was elected indirectly. 
The criticisms of the 1932 Electoral Code resulted in the promulgation of the second 
Brazilian Electoral Code (Law nº 48 of 1935), which substituted the first one without 
altering the conquests achieved up to then. 
In 1937,  Getúlio  Vargas,  supported by socially  conservative segments of  society, 
announced the "New Order" for the country, and the 1937 Constitution extinguished 
the Electoral Judiciary, abolished existing political parties, suspended free elections 
and established an indirect election for the President of the Republic, with a six year 
mandate. The Vargas era was marked by the dictatorship of the New State with the 
centralization of power and, therefore, by the absence of presidential elections, and 
also  by  interventions  in  the  states,  where  administrators  loyal  to  Vargas  were 
nominated. This “New Order” was opposed by intellectuals, students, religious bodies 
and businessmen who fought for the redemocratization of the country. 
At the end of 1945, the Vargas dictatorship ended and the country began a process 
of redemocratization. Presidential elections were reestablished within new standards 
defined  since  the  1930  Revolution.  The  Electoral  Judiciary  began  to  function 
effectively,  and finally,  women could actually participate in the elections.  Between 
1945 and 1964, Brazil  had several  presidents, but only Getúlio Vargas, Juscelino 
Kubitscheck and Jânio Quadros were actually elected by the popular vote.
From 1964, Brazil was governed by the military who instituted a system of indirect 
elections, thus interrupting the process of popular participation in the choice of who 
ran  the  country,  and  they  introduced  presidential  elections  through  an  Electoral 
College.  This was to make sure that the choice for president remained under the 
control of the military and those politicians who supported them. 
The electoral  legislation  in  the period between 1964 and 1985 was marked by a 
succession of institutional decrees and constitutional amendments, laws and decree-
laws, with which the Military Government conducted the electoral process so as to 
conform to its interests, with the aim of establishing a system as anticipated by the 
1964 Movement and of obtaining a majority favourable to the government. With this 
objective in mind, the Regime altered the duration of  mandates, cancelled political 
rights, decreed indirect elections for President of the Republic, state and territorial 
governors,  and  for  mayors  of  municipalities  considered  as  relevant  for  national 
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defence  and  water  stanzas,  established    “candidaturas  natas”  (automatic 
candidacy),  straight  ticket  voting,  sub-tickets  and  altered  the  calculation  for  the 
number of deputies in the House. This calculation  was sometimes based, either on 
the  population  or  on  the  electorate,  thus  benefiting   states  which  were  political 
newcomers in detriment to those which were traditionally more active, and, therefore, 
reinforcing the government’s discretionary power. 
At the beginning of the 1980s, society began to mobilize for political changes which 
would result in a redemocratization of the country, culminating in the civil movement 
known as “Direct Elections Now”.  
The first civilian president of the New Republic (1985) after the military regime, was 
also elected indirectly and gave the presidency to Tancredo Neves. He died before 
taking office and consequently his vice, José Sarney, assumed the presidency.  In 
1990, the first direct elections took place in Brazil since 1960. Fernando Collor de 
Mello was elected the first  President  of  the Republic under the rules of the 1988 
Constitution, which included complete freedom for political parties and a two-round 
election process. In 1992, Collor de Mello was accused of corruption and criminal 
activities, which resulted in his being removed from the presidency and having his 
political rights revoked  for the next eight years. 
The  1988  Constitution  determined  that  a  plebiscite  be  held  to  define  the  form 
(republic or constitutional monarchy), and the system of government (parliamentary 
or presidential), and determined that the president and governors , as well as those 
mayors of municipalities with more than 200,000 voters, were elected by an absolute 
majority or in two rounds of voting, if no candidate achieved an absolute  majority in 
the  first  round.  In  municipalities  with  less  than 200,000 voters,  the  heads of  the 
Executive  would  be  elected  in  one  round  of  voting  by  a  simple  majority.  
6. Actor strategies and the political processes
Brazil is a country which became democratic while maintaining high levels of social, 
cultural  and  economic  inequalities,  and  this  can  still  be  seen  in  the  different 
characteristics of its immense territory, in the urban and rural areas, in the people 
who are intellectuals and those that can’t read or write, and in the political elites and 
the people. Thus Brazilian democracy developed with a gap between the different 
groups which make up the nation and their mutual ignorance. 
The options defined in different situations of Brazilian politics resulted from preceding 
decisions and choices of the relevant actors, and this influenced the course of the 
political process to the point of limiting the range of possibilities in future scenarios, 
and therefore, the courses of action.  
The political vices which originated from the colonization of Brazil are one of the main 
causes  of  the  difficulties  of  implementing  democracy  in  the  country,  since  they 
stopped  the  development  of  institutions  and  of  individuals  capable  of  promoting 
democratic practices. 
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The political  process  during  the  Empire  and  the  beginning  of  the  Republic  was 
marked  by  significant  brutality  against  opposition  movements  and  by  conciliatory 
government actions to stop political  conflicts.  This blocked all  and any social  and 
political  process,  hindering  the  organization  of  political-party  groups  and  popular 
demands.  These actions were undertaken by two political groups: the Moderates 
and  the  Conservatives,  who  obstructed  the  action  of  a  third  political  group:  the 
“Exalted  ones”  (democrats  –  republicans).  One  example  of  these  conservative 
strategies  was  the  Independence  of  Brazil  –  a  counter-revolutionary  movement 
undertaken  to  stop  the  initiation  of  disputes  favourable  to  the  Republic  and  to 
suffocate  democratic  ideas  and  actions.  Independence  prepared  the  ground  for 
various  blows  against  national  sovereignty  by  politicians  who  were  used  to 
Portuguese absolutism, and for the dismantling of actions by the political opposition  
After 1889, private interests and political servility intensified, and were fundamental 
ingredients  for  material  and political  corruption  and  the  stifling  of  the  democratic 
process. 
With the intensification of urbanization and industrialization in the 1930s, significant 
economic  and  social  changes  took  place,  but  the  oligarchies  continued  to  stifle 
political  reforms.  Industrialization  and  urbanization  revealed  old  and  new  social, 
economic  and  political  problems  which  became  challenges  for  governments, 
incapable of developing programmes which could contemplate all  levels of society. 
This situation was ripe for military intervention in the government and this put a stop 
to the possibilities of developing a democratic society for two decades. 
The military  government  in  Brazil  based  itself  on  the  foundations  of  the  political 
institutions  which  the  military  operated  under  and  on  the  model  of  economic 
development. Politically, it was a typical military regime in the sense that the Armed 
Forces,  as an institution,  started to run the country which resulted in the military 
institution also becoming an arena for disputing political power, and this  resulted in 
consequences not only for the internal cohesion of the organization, but also for the 
whole  political  dynamics.  However,  it  was  a  situation  which  maintained  the 
mechanisms and procedures of a representative democracy functioning: Congress 
and the Judiciary continued to function even though their  powers were drastically 
curtailed and various of their members expelled; the rotation in the Presidency of the 
Republic was kept; periodic elections were maintained, although under various types 
of control; and the political parties continued to function, even though party activities 
were  drastically  limited.  This  peculiar  arrangement  was  largely  responsible  for 
successive political crises which accompanied the regime, and was characterized by 
alternate  phases  of  repression  and  liberalization,  permeated  with  political  crises 
resulting  from  conflicts  within  the  army  and  between  these  groups  and  the 
democratic opposition. 
Regarding economic policy, with the exception of the first three years of government, 
when efforts were concentrated on the stabilization programme to contain the high 
levels  of inflation,  during the period of  the military,  the economy followed the so-
called  “Brazilian  Miracle”,  with  a  policy  of  stabilization  and  a  model  of  import 
substitution which reserved for the state a still more important  and active role. The 
policy of import substitution of capital goods and raw materials, sustained by public 
sector investments and foreign loans, was a successful strategy since it guaranteed 
11
C2D Working Paper Series 14/2008
high  levels  of  investment  and  made  the  experience  of  the  authoritarian  military 
regime  a  case  of  successful  economic  development.  However,  it  was  also 
responsible for instabilities and economic problems which had provoked the military 
intervention in  1964,  and high inflation and economic stagnation reappeared with 
even more intensity, forming a background to the process of political transition. 
Another  important  basis  which  gave support  to  the military  government  in  power 
(1964–85)  was  a  deliberate  policy  of  modernizing  communications.  With  the 
imposition of censorship, the modernization of the media was part of a strategy linked 
to  the  ideology  of  national  security.  One  of  the  symbols  of  this  project  was  the 
creation in 1965 of Embratel  (Brazilian Company for  Telecommunications),  of  the 
Ministry  of  Communications,  and in  1972,  of  Telebras (Brazilian  Communications 
PLC),  responsible  for  coordinating the services of  telecommunications  throughout 
Brazil. 
The  military  government  also  invested  in  political  propaganda  with  the  object  of 
mobilizing society around a national development project which would legitimize the 
military regime in the name of administrative rationality and economic efficacy. The 
military used the power  of  images to communicate their  proposals  of  Brazil  as a 
world power. The publicity campaigns had an educational or civic theme. 
With  some  exceptions,  the  project  for  modernizing  communications  significantly 
benefitted media businessmen with loans from government banks to buy imported 
equipment  and  for  building  projects.    Besides  this,  the  publicity  from  official 
institutions greatly benefitted the media, seeing that 30% of newspaper income came 
from government clients, which meant a considerable economic dependence on the 
state. The media businessmen were also benefitted with concessions for radio and 
television stations.
The onus of this support and these benefits were censorship and the repression of 
communications.  Thus,  the  owners  of  the  means  of  communication  submitted 
themselves  to  censorship  mainly  because  of  their  economic  dependence  on  the 
state,  and this may have functioned as a possible opposition.  The owners of the 
means of communication did not form alliances to oppose the regime, instead, they 
attacked and criticized each other, thus blocking the formation of a common identity.  
Prior censorship of the media, with censors located inside newspaper offices – which 
damaged the owners’  authority and power  –  created conditions  for  the media  to 
move away from the military and move towards the journalists who were fighting for 
press freedom. However, the behaviour of the newspapers was not homogeneous, 
some gave in  to  censorship  pressures  while  others used creative  alternatives  to 
denounce the repression and lack of freedom. 
Until 1970, a publication company was controlled by its owner with a possibility of 
total domination of the political slant and the news items. In the 1970s and 1980s, the 
power of communications’ businesses acquired a further dimension: they were not in 
the  hands  of  a  single  owner  and  they  acted  according  to  market  principles  and 
capitalist logic. The profile of journalists also changed due to the position of prestige 
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they had won from the public,  attracting readers and an audience for the media. 
These professionals often held political opinions which differed from their owners.   
The media and journalists used various strategies to denounce censorship, military 
oppression and the economic policies adopted at that time. The anti-establishment 
press, cartoons, economic editorials, the opinion pages and the soap operas were 
the  means  through  which  the  government  was  criticized.  The  anti-establishment 
press was one of the most important channels for criticizing the economic model and 
human rights’ violations. 
The economic editorials exercised an important political influence since they started 
a campaign against the economic model which was used as a focus of  opposition to 
the  regime and  to  question  the  continuity  of  the  military  in  power.    This  event 
provoked  a  response  from  other  actors  which,  up  to  then,  had  not  manifested 
themselves, such as the businessmen and the unions. 
The  transition  from  the  military  regime  to  democracy   began  in  1974  with  the 
proposal of a slow and gradual political liberalization controlled by the authorities and 
which aimed to recuperate the legitimacy of the regime and the capacity of the state 
to make decisions.  Press liberalization was included in the strategic points of this 
project, especially the written press. However, during the whole period of the Geisel 
government,  the  legislation  which  stifled  freedom of  expression  continued,  which 
encouraged self-censorship.  During this period, there were advances and retreats in 
this area.
The  political  reconstruction  of  Brazil  demanded  the  appearance  of  new  political 
actors.  The  modernization  of  the  economy  during  the  so-called  “economic 
miracle” (1968–1974) resulted in the emergence of associations of interests, linked 
principally to middleclass urban sectors, which grew strongly during this period.  It 
was these sectors, in alliance with the union movement, which actively took part in 
demands for the end of the military regime.  The manifestations of the church, of the 
unions,  of  professional  associations,  of  the  opposition  parties  and  of  the  media, 
pressured the military government, and defended a return to democracy and gave 
support to the actions of the Geisel government in support of political freedom. 
The 1974 legislative elections played an important part  in the liberalization of the 
regime, and the media helped in this process.  The opposition had free access to the 
means  of  communication  which  allowed  an  ample  mobilization  of  the  opposition 
party,  MDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement), which achieved a significant victory 
over Arena, the government party. 
Another  decisive  factor  in  the redemocratization of  Brazil  was the election  of  the 
democrat Jimmy Carter to the presidency of the U.S.A. in 1977. His foreign policy in 
defence of democratic principles,  proposed that the U.S.A move away from those 
countries which did not respect human rights, and this greatly pressured the Brazilian 
government, since U.S. military cooperation was linked to the observance of these 
rights in Brazil.  
At the beginning of the 1980s, the debate about the role of the state in the economy 
became central to those who opposed the regime. When they saw that economic 
policy tended to increase the participation of state enterprises in the dynamics of 
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development, the businessmen allied themselves to other sectors of society which 
questioned  the  permanence  of  the  military  in  power.  The  participation  of  the 
businessmen in opposing the regime became apparent through the media, making 
greater advances in the redemocratization process possible.
With the end of the military regime, more competition between the three branches of 
the Armed Forces (Navy, Army and Air Force), surfaced, reducing the capacity of a 
combined military reaction. In spite of the military’s influence on government having 
been reduced since 1985, with a tendency to decrease even more as the Brazilian 
democratic process consolidates itself, caution must be practiced regarding military 
actions in the future. The analysis of military performance in Brazilian Republican 
history,  associated with the perception of  a significant  social  inequality  which  still 
exists in Brazilian society, allows one to imagine that, with a worsening of social or 
economic crises, the tendency of military subordination may be changed. 
It’s  worth  stressing  that  in  the  1988  Constitution  the  military  guaranteed  the 
maintenance of conscription, the control of civil aviation and the maintenance of the 
constitutional role of the Armed Forces as upholders of law and order in the case of 
civil disturbances.   
The democratization which began with the restoration of the civilian government was 
not the result of a break with the old order. This implies that the reconstruction of the 
political system occurred through flexible arrangements and the interweaving of new 
and  old  practices  and structures,  and  this  combination   molded  the  options  and 
strategies followed by the principal  actors of the political  process.  Observing the 
political system in Brazil today, it cannot be denied that we are dealing with a regime 
which is quite clearly a democracy. The Federal Constitution (1988) increased the 
right  of  the  citizen  to  participate  politically  and  introduced  a  series  of  original 
measures into Brazilian legislation, involving the defence of civil liberties.  However, 
the latter are more “rights-to-principle” rather than “rights-to-use”.  It cannot be denied 
that  problems  exist  regarding  the  “quality”  of  public  opposition  and  citizen 
participation  as  well  as  the  effective  functioning  of  the  process  of  democratic 
decision-making. 
7. Effects and evolution of direct democracy     
In contrast to other countries, the building of the Brazilian state was oriented towards 
the maintenance of relationships which benefitted the political, economic and social 
elites.  Instead of combating privileges which would establish the regime of rights, 
there were  political  arrangements which  preserved the privileges of  the few.  The 
prevalence  of  patrimonial  and  paternalist  characteristics  and  of  conservatism  in 
relations between the state and society is still  very strong in Brazil.  The decision 
about public agendas is linked to political patronage, complicating the consolidation 
of an organized and active civilian society, which fights for the building of relations of 
common rights for all, independent of the groups to which people belong. 
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The political apathy of Brazilian society can be included with this situation, the result 
of depolitization caused by neo-liberalism, the worry for immediate solutions and the 
enormous suspicion of the politicians, reflecting in the low level and low quality of 
citizen participation. 
The participation of Brazilians in elections is due, without a doubt, to the fact that 
voting  is  obligatory.  Compared  to  the  size  of  its  population  and  territory,   the 
involvement of the Brazilian citizen in organizations and manifestations about  the 
defence of public interests is inexpressive. In this context, the mere anticipation of 
legal  measures  in  the  Federal  Constitution  does  not  guarantee  the  effective 
implementation  of  popular  participation  which  would  support  the  legitimacy  of 
democracy in public administration. 
Despite this national situation, Brazil presently has around 27 thousand Managerial 
Councils, all functioning at the same level and making decisions, and hundreds of 
experiences of Participatory Budgets, principally at the municipal level, implemented 
in areas of democratic construction and they undoubtedly reflect a conquest of civil 
society. These areas need to be valued as areas built for citizens’ participation, as a 
result  of  battles  and  conquests.  They  arose  because  the  political  system  was 
incapable of absorbing the new collective actors of civil  society who demanded a 
greater participation in the public scene. However, these spaces have a dimension 
exactly as areas for  discussion and,  therefore,  reflect the relationships of  various 
interests which are often not representative. 
The simple creation and implementation of popular participatory areas in Brazilian 
politics did not mean a significant contribution for the democratization of the areas of 
power and for making rights universal. Brazilian society relegated the strengthening 
of  organizations,  of  movements,  of  forms  of  representation  at  district  level,  of 
communities, to a lower priority so that the participatory mechanisms at the grass 
roots level really had a capacity to mobilize which would “empower” them in these 
areas of dispute. 
The few popular  participatory channels  which exist  are restricted to the executive 
branch of public administration. Participation should be extended to the judiciary and 
legislative branches. Brazilian inexperience in exercising citizenship in these areas is 
linked to the lack of a capacity of society to participate. 
Another  challenge  for  Brazilian  democracy  is  the  fragmentation  caused  by  the 
multiplicity of areas for participation. The actual model of mechanisms created for 
popular participation greatly fragments the vision of the whole and the possibility for 
collective intervention. The number of Managerial Councils in many municipalities, 
some  of  which  were  founded  by  federal  laws,  others  founded  through  the 
fundamental  municipal  law,  hinders  the effective representation  of  society.  These 
mechanisms end up being used to present a democratic picture of the government 
without effectively having any decision-making capacity. The practice of participation 
often comes down  to including  the  population  with  the  aim of  ratifying  decisions 
already made by public authorities. 
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Democratic mechanisms need to be transformed in place of dispute and, in this case, 
popular  participation  can represent  a loss  of  power  and control  of  administrative 
actions of the public authorities, often meaning interruptions in the political process of 
development.  . 
The difficulty of practicing social participation in Brazil also includes the fact that the 
process, based on objectives and community priorities, is, necessarily, of a political 
nature which hinders the participation of the population due to the manipulation of 
decisions  by  opposition  or  government  groups  who  know better  how to  use the 
proceedings and the dynamics. The collective interest is, in some cases, represented 
and expressed  through self-nominated  community  leaders  or  who  represent  only 
small sections of the community. Besides this, the legal demands for guaranteeing 
society’s participation in the whole process, use financial and human resources and 
cause delays in taking decisions, resulting in  disbelief and the abandonment of the 
participatory area conquered. 
 
The continuity of the participatory processes is gravely affected by government and 
party-political  changes.  The new administrations  tend  to  interrupt  the  projects  of 
opposing administrations which have a political impact, abandoning them or altering 
them significantly, so as to disfigure them, thus reducing the possibility that they may 
produce political dividends for their creators. 
One of the biggest challenges of a proposed increase in participation is to guarantee 
the definition of the criteria of representation, in order to stop not only its manipulation 
by groups guided by special interests but also the possibility of its use by the public 
administration. 
There are experiences of popular participation in really democratic administrations 
which  merit  note and which  can be understood by other  localities.  Among these 
experiences are the Participatory Budget and the Municipal Sector Councils created 
in  popular  administrations,  as for  example,  in Porto Alegre (RS).  The analysis  of 
these experiences, even those still little consolidated, showed they were positive for 
the growth of a participatory culture of society and, principally, in its qualification for 
the exercise of participation and the social control of public administration.  
Participation in these areas awakens the citizen to public life, whether it be through 
acquiring basic information about the administration of his/  her locality and public 
policies, or by the appearance of new leaders who now take part in other areas of 
participatory management.   Learning, knowledge and access to information appear 
as the principal positive result in experiences of shared management. On the other 
hand,  participation also positively impacts the logic of governments which start  to 
introduce in the public administration area, even if  superficially,  a sense of public 
responsibility,  which often demands the implementation of strategic planning  and 
administrative reform and the adjustment of the public administration to transparency, 
to publicity of its decisions and to social priorities. 
However, the job of implanting and institutionalizing initiatives such as these in other 
localities  in  Brazil  still  meets  some  obstacles.  Citizen  participation  in  Brazil  is 
considered a rhetorical excess, organized around sectors and related to managerial 
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and not structural questions. The democratic processes present in Brazilian politics 
are only to accomplish bureaucratic steps without any qualitative evaluation of their 
effects.  
The discussions and public debates are substituted with automatic systems such as 
researching people’s opinions and suggestions boxes, reducing participation to the 
theoretical level and transforming the role of the citizen into that of a consumer. In 
general, those governments which increase the areas of public participation manage 
to attract only a limited social segment, representatives of organized special interest 
groups,  which  stand out  due to  the lack  of  organization  of  civil  society.  Thus,  a 
situation of bureaucratization of participation is created with practices of patronage in 
new forms, with party exploitation and the manipulation of participating institutions. 
The adherence of civil society to democratic mechanisms is a long-term perspective 
if  an  effective  and  constant  process  of  education  is  begun  which   strengthens 
citizenship  and  a  participatory  culture.  Allied  to  this  condition  is  the  action  of 
government which should create the necessary conditions so that  the democratic 
instruments can be effectively taken up by the population. This means investing in 
capabilities, producing information - making it available in a democratic manner – and 
making managerial structures more and more answerable to society’s demands.   
The overcoming of the difficulties for implanting and maintaining participatory areas 
should be developed through a pedagogy of popular participation, facing a series of 
challenges  in  daily  relationships  with  the  population.  The  building  up  of  an 
understanding of the global reality of the locality, which confronts the necessities to 
attend to  immediate,  unique  demands often  present  in  the  processes  of  popular 
participation, is necessary. 
Another important aspect to be considered in direct democratic mechanisms, is the 
need  to  adapt  government  talk  and  actions  to  the  diversity  of  social  subjects, 
respecting the limitations of understanding and recognizing popular common sense. 
Besides this, the systematic and continuous relationship with the population requires: 
a knowledge of the popular image of the government, of the figure of the governing 
institution and of the public services; the pedagogic confrontation of conflicts, through 
the expression of the interests in play and the stimulation of the forms of organization 
to face them, comes to mean a factor of  growth in political education. 
8.  Political  mobilization  and   ICTs  (Information  and  Communication 
Technology)
The use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in Brazil has been 
growing significantly especially with regard to the internet, even if it is exclusive. Most 
Brazilian experiences which aimed at exploring the communication potential of the 
ICTs for politics is restricted to the municipal sphere, since the social dimension of 
the  town,  the  political  unit  which  is  geographically  concentrated,  reflects  civic 
relationships sooner. 
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The political  use of  the ICTs in  the contemporary democratic  system of  Brazil  is 
varied, with greater or lesser emphasis on certain aspects of digital democracy and 
presenting different  levels of  possibilities for civil  participation in the processes of 
political decision-making. 
Most of the municipal experience using ICTs can be characterized by the emphasis 
on the availability of information and in the providing of public services. Therefore, it 
can be considered as a democratic instrument since generic government information 
circulates  and  improves  the  supply  of  public  services.  However,  they  are 
predominantly  one-way  instruments,  meaning  that  the  government  provides 
information but does not allow feed-back from society. 
In a smaller degree, cases can be observed in which the government uses the ICTs 
to sound out  public  opinion  and makes use of  this information to take a political 
decision. In these cases, the use of ICTs has a role close to that of a “channel of 
communication”, although the communication continues to be mainly one-way:  the 
government does not create an effective dialogue with the civilian population,  but 
emits signals to the public so as to receive some type of response, which doesn’t 
necessarily mean that the opinions collected will  be fully taken into account in all 
fields of political decision. 
Specifically in relation to the participation of civilian society in decisions on the public 
agenda, it’s possible to find in very isolated instances, information about the use of 
ICTs  in  the  decision-making  processes  through  the  Participatory  Budget  and 
Municipal Conferences. 
The Brazilian experience in Porto Alegre (RS) gives a positive answer to the question 
of the use of ICTs. The site for the  Orçamento Participativo (Participatory Budget) 
(http://www2.portoalegre.rs.gov.br/op/default.php) of Porto Alegre has various roles, 
including:  increasing the divulgation  of  information about  the Participatory Budget 
(agenda, guidelines, structure, etc), allowing the control and supervision of citizens’ 
demands at a distance, and increasing the participation of society.  In this case, the 
target is primarily the middle class, traditionally less present in the meetings of the 
Participatory Budget, since it lives in areas where basic infrastructure and services 
are good.  
Another project of  Porto Alegre’s town hall,  aimed at a distinct  community,  is  the 
Telecentres, rooms with computer facilities in outlying city districts, where as well as 
learning to use the computer and the Internet (with the help of monitors), people can 
listen to music and involve themselves in other cultural activities.   
There are similar experiences in other Brazilian cities, although sometimes they run 
up against serious financial difficulties, as in the case of the city of São Paulo (SP). 
The  town  hall  is  implementing  a  project  of  Telecentres,  (projeto  de  Telecentros 
paulistanos (http://www.prefeitura.sp.gov.br/servicos/cidadaos/ cidadania/telecentros/
index.php), which are installed in spaces which were originally reserved for shops in 
public  housing  projects,  and  which  are  now abandoned  or  unused.   In  the  117 
Telecentres installed in areas with the greatest digital exclusion in São Paulo courses 
are offered on learning to use computers, citizenship and the web. 
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The municipality of Ipatinga (MG) is another example of a public administration which 
uses ICTs for  contacts  with  the population.  Ipatinga established the Participatory 
Budget  in  1989,  but  only  in  2001  did  it  make  available  digital  channels  of 
communication for public participation (http://opa.ipatinga.mg.gov.br/). 
The beginning of the process of electronic interactivity in Ipatinga’s Extended Public 
Budget  (OPA) had as an objective  the approximation  of  the municipality’s  young 
people to decisions on the municipal budget, as well as increasing the number of 
participants in general, making the administration of public monies transparent and 
opening up access to information.  Besides making requests, the population can, 
through the Internet,  also accompany the progress of those public  works projects 
defined as a priority by the OPA.  
In 2005, Ipatinga set up the project e-Now, which allowed the public to participate 
through electronic  channels.   Besides  the  internet,  requests  could  also  be made 
through “Dial and Participate”, a voice server where the population dials the number 
0800-885-4000  and  makes  its  requests  in  pre-defined  areas.  This  means  of 
communication  does  not  permit  requests  which  have  not  been  included  in  the 
electronic service. Another improvement permitted by the partnership is the use of 
SMS, a message service on mobile telephones, advising the dates and places of the 
regional assemblies to be held in the OPA.
These  two  modes  of  ICT  are  only  available  for  those  regions  chosen  for 
experimentation for the project e-Now (3, 4, 5 e 7). Dial and Participate and the SMS 
server are paid for by the European Commission. 
The  participation  of  the  population  via  the  Internet  was  expanded  to  the  whole 
municipality, including the countryside. The town hall made available 19 stands with 
computer terminals which allowed electronic access to OPA in the municipality, with 
17 located in schools distributed in 7 district offices, 1 in the town hall foyer, and 1 in 
the Shopping Centre Vale do Aço. All the stands have monitors who are trained to 
help the population register and request public works and services. 
According to the TRE – Regional Electoral Tribunal, of Minas Gerais, the Ipatinga 
municipality  has  an  electorate  of  156,016  people.  The  objective  of  participation 
established  by  the  coordination  of  the  OPA  project  was  5%  of  this  electorate. 
However,  according  to  information  from  the  coordinators,  this  objective  was  not 
reached  because  the  number  of  votes  on  the  site  up  to  July  5th,  2005,  totaled 
26,688, which may not be the same as the number of electors registered because 
each participant can vote in various requests and as many times as he or she wants. 
Due to the low participation electronically,  some schools  used another method to 
increase participation. Paper forms were distributed to the students, to be filled in by 
their  parents  at  home.  With  the  forms  filled  in  and  returned  to  the  schools,  the 
monitors transferred the data to the OPA site, counting them as registrations done 
via the internet. 
Among the weaknesses  found in  the  electronically-operated OPA in  the Ipatinga 
municipality (MG), were: 
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Participation less than expected.  The use of paper forms was outside the context of 
electronic  democracy.  The possibility  of  bringing  the  population  into  contact  with 
digital systems was frustrated by the need to use such an expedient. With the help of 
the monitor, the moment of registration could be a first contact for many people with 
the computer and the internet.  It  could be a moment to learn and be aware of a 
means to follow and supervise public actions electronically
Not keeping the computers in the schools is also one of the weaknesses. 
     
The computers available were rented and were not available for  the population to 
accompany the implementation and the priorities voted in the assemblies.  
Some potentialities of electronic interactivity should be pointed out, including:
1. The increase in participation by young people. This was one of the objectives of 
the implementation of the electronic interactivity in the participatory budget.  
2. A visible success of Ipatinga’s OPA in 2004, already with interactivity in place, was 
the setting up of a factory to treat milk from the Tribuna district, in the countryside. 
Although it had no computers provided by the town hall, the countryside succeeded 
in  convincing  all  the  other  regions  to  give  up  part  of  their  budget  quotas,  thus 
demonstrating that the factory would bring benefits to the whole municipality.  This is 
one of the results of public participation and of the debate taking part in the Municipal 
Congress of Budgetary Priorities.  
In this area, it can be concluded that, although public decision-making is part of the 
political culture of some governments, the potential of ICTs is not actually being used 
to this end in Brazil.  
According to research done by IBOPE in 2003,  the number  of  potential  users in 
Brazil (people who live in homes which have at least a computer with web access) is 
20.5 million; and more than 42 million users (35.04% of the total) visited sites of 
the state and federal governments, placing Brazil as world leader in this area in 
relative terms (followed by the government sites of France (31.2%), Spain (30.9%), 
USA (25.3%), United Kingdom (23%) and Germany (19%).  The expansion of  the 
number of potential  users in Brazil  was 43.5% in 2003 compared to the previous 
year.
The information presented by IBOPE demonstrates that a possibility for a greater and 
better use of the ICTs as a tool for political mobilization for direct democracy in Brazil 
exists,  by transforming itself  into an important  instrument of  interaction,  of  citizen 
participation,  of  information  from politicians,  from citizens,  from governments  and 
from political parties.  However, what actually prevails are daily interactions between 
the political system with the “one-way” citizens.  Despite the talk of modernization by 
governments, there are few significant advances in civilian participation which could 
promote relevant alterations in the political culture which exists today.  
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